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ABSTRACT
The Internet of Things (IoT) is here and growing rapidly as
consumers eagerly adopt internet-enabled devices for their utility,
features, and convenience. But this dramatic expansion also
exacerbates two underlying dangers in the IoT. First, hackers in
the IoT may attempt to gain control of internet-enabled devices,
causing negative consequences in the physical world. Given that
objects with internet connectivity range from household appliances
and automobiles to major infrastructure components, this danger is
potentially severe. Indeed, in the last few years, hackers have
gained control of cars, trains, and dams, and some experts think
that even commercial airplanes could be at risk. Second, IoT
devices pose an enormous risk to the stability of the internet itself,
as they are vulnerable to being hacked and recruited into botnets
used for attacks on the digital world. Recent attacks on major
websites including Netflix and Twitter exemplify this danger. This
article surveys these dangers, summarizes some of their main
causes, and then analyzes the extent to which current laws like the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act punish hacking in the IoT. The
article finds that although hacking in the IoT is likely illegal, the
current legal regime punishes hacking after the fact and therefore
lacks the prospective force needed to fully temper the risks posed
by the IoT. Therefore, other solutions are needed to address the
perilousness of the IoT in its current form. After a discussion of the
practical and legal barriers to investigating and prosecuting
hacking, we turn to the merits and pitfalls of hacking back from
legal, practical, and ethical perspectives. We then discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of two possible solutions—
regulation and the standards approach.
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INTRODUCTION
This is the age of the Internet of Things (IoT), where “everyday
objects . . . connect to the Internet and . . . send and receive data.”1 The
lines between computers and humans have blurred as “[t]he Internet now
affects the world in a direct physical manner.” 2 The Federal Trade
Commission predicts that more than fifty billion devices will be part of
the IoT by 2020,3 including items ranging from kitchen appliances to
Fitbits and heart monitors.4 As Bruce Schneier explained to Congress,
“everything is now a computer.”5 The reach of the IoT extends beyond
consumer goods to major items and infrastructure components, including
cars, airplanes,6 hospitals, telecommunications networks, and power
grids.7 As a result, “insecurity” in the IoT “puts human safety at risk.”8
Moreover, in the age of the IoT, the actions of “hackers” may carry
physical consequences.9
This article proceeds as follows. Section I describes episodes in
which the IoT has already been hacked as well as the potential for other
FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A
CONNECTED WORLD (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internetthings-privacy/150127IOTrpt.pdf.
2
Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Hearing
Before H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of
Bruce Schneier), [hereinafter “Schneier”].
3
Christina Scelsi, Care and Feeding of Privacy Policies and Keeping the Big Data
Monster at Bay: Legal Concerns in Healthcare in the Age of the Internet of Things,
39 NOVA L. REV. 391, 396 (2015).
4
Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)?, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 19,
2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-the-internet-of-things-definition2016-8.
5
Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks
(preliminary transcript): Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
114th Cong. 27 (2016) (testimony of Bruce Schneier), http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf
[hereinafter “Schneier Testimony”]. At the time of his testimony, Schneier was
identified as special advisor to IBM Security and CTO of Resilient: an IBM
Company, a fellow of the Berkman-Klein Center at Harvard University, and a
lecturer and fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
6
Id. at 29.
7
Id. at 57.
8
Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Hearing
Before H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of
Kevin Fu), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-114IF17-Wstate-FuK-20161116.pdf [hereinafter “Fu”] (warning the HECC that “the
Dyn attack is a sign of worse pains to come”).
9
See section I, infra.
1
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attacks, and Section II examines the reasons for the vulnerabilities that
facilitate hacking. Section III explores how criminal law now responds to
attacks on the IoT, focusing on the applicability of the federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)10 to common forms of hacking IoT devices,
and Section IV discusses the practical and legal barriers to investigation and
prosecution of hacking. Section V evaluates the merits and pitfalls of
hacking back against botnets, from legal, practical, and ethical standpoints.
Section VI briefly summarizes two other possibilities for securing the IoT,
before the article provides a general summary in Section VII. We conclude
that solutions are urgently needed, despite the difficulty in crafting a fully
satisfactory response.

I. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES
A. How the IoT Has Been Hacked
On October 21, 2016, major websites, including Netflix, Twitter,
Reddit, and the New York Times, were inaccessible for as long as several
hours.11 The interruption was the result of a Distributed Denial of Service
attack (“DDoS”)12 against the company Dyn, which “is one of many outfits
that host the Domain Name System, or DNS, which functions as a
switchboard for the internet.”13 The perpetrators of the Dyn attack
exploited “a vulnerability in large numbers—possibly millions—of . . .
devices like webcams and digital video recorders” and used them as a
botnet14 to flood Dyn with traffic.15 This “attack traffic” combined with

10

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites Across
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/business/
internet-problems-attack.html?_r=0.
12
A DDoS is when “an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from accessing
information or services. . . . [such as] when an attacker ‘floods’ a network with
information. . . . The server can only process a certain number of requests at once,
so if an attacker overloads the server with requests, it can't process [legitimate
requests]. This is a ‘denial of service’ because you can't access that site.” Mindi
McDowell, Security Tip (ST04-015) Understanding Denial-of Service Attacks, USCERT, Feb. 6, 2013, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015.
13
Perlroth, supra note 11.
14
A botnet is a “collection of computers compromised by malicious code and
controlled across a network.” Glossary, US-CERT, Jan. 11, 2017, https://niccs.uscert.gov/glossary#B. Although they can be used for collaboration, “botnet” is a
pejorative term. Zach Lerner, Microsoft the Botnet Hunter: The Role of PublicPrivate Partnerships in Mitigating Botnets, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 237–38.
(2014).
15
Schneier, supra note 2, at 2.
11
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“legitimate traffic” to overwhelm Dyn,16 taking down “dozens of websites”
with it.17
Despite the large scale of the interruption, the Dyn attack has been
characterized as “benign” since it did not result in physical injury or
property damage.18 Nevertheless, it demonstrated the risk that the next
attack may be devastating.19
In response to the Dyn attack, the House Energy and Commerce
Committee (HECC) held a hearing to address the threats posed by hacking
in the IoT.20 Expert testimony was grave. Bruce Schneier warned that “the
internet is now dangerous . . . .”21 Dr. Kevin Fu told the HECC that he
“fear[s] for the day where every hospital system is down, for instance,
because an [IoT] attack brings down the entire healthcare system.”22 Dale
Drew cautioned that the culprits of the Dyn attack relied on “just a fraction
of the total available compromised [IoT devices] . . . demonstrating the
potential for significantly greater havoc . . . .”23
Illustrations of the dangers abound. Many prominent examples of
hacking in the IoT pertain to automobiles.24 In 2015, Fiat Chrysler recalled
16

Scott Hilton, Dyn Analysis Summary of Friday October 21 Attack, VANTAGE
POINT, Oct. 26, 2016, http://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october
-21-attack/.
17
Schneier, supra note 2, at 2.
18
Schneier, supra note 2, at 3.
19
See Fu, supra note 8, at 2.
20
Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks
(preliminary transcript): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
114th Cong. 4–5 (2016) (statements of Greg P. Walden, Chairman, Subcomm. on
Commc’n & Tech.), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/
HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf .
21
Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 59.
22
Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks
(preliminary transcript): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
114th Cong. 43. (2016) (testimony of Kevin Fu), http://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf
[hereinafter “Fu Testimony”].
23
Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statements
of Dale Drew), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG114-IF17-Wstate-DrewD-20161116.pdf [hereinafter “Drew”]. At the hearing,
Drew was identified as senior vice president and chief security officer for Level 3
Communications.
24
Automobiles are an obvious target for hackers because they can cause physical
damage, and because they are vulnerable. See Cheryl Dancey Balough & Richard
C. Balough, Cyberterrorism on Wheels: Are Today's Cars Vulnerable to Attack?,
BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2013, at 1 (“The potential exists that a car's computers, like
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1.4 million cars in response to a widely publicized demonstration where
hackers took control of a Jeep Cherokee through its infotainment system.25
They were able to “turn the steering wheel, briefly disable the brakes and
shut down the engine.”26 Additionally, in 2010, the disgruntled former
employee of a used-car dealership remotely accessed the company’s
computers and wreaked havoc by setting off car alarms and shutting down
engines.27
The danger is not limited to cars. For example, in 2008, a fourteenyear-old boy hacked into the system controlling the trains of Lodz, Poland
as a prank.28 He made several trains change tracks, causing multiple
derailments and injuries.29 In 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
the Department of Homeland Security “issued a warning” about “several . .
. attacks against the 911 system.”30 The attacks were an attempt to extort
money, and when the perpetrators received nothing they “launched [a] high
volume of calls against the target network, tying up the system from
receiving legitimate calls.”31 In 2016, Iranian hackers breached “the
computer-guided controls” of the small Bowman Dam in suburban Rye
any computer system, can be hacked, leaving the car vulnerable to infection by
malware. These vulnerabilities pose serious safety hazards should they be exploited
nefariously. Legal implications of this technological vulnerability have yet to be
adequately addressed.”). Cars contain dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs)
“embedded in the body, doors, dash, roof, trunk, seats, wheels, navigation
equipment, and entertainment centers,” many of which connect to the internet and
provide access points for hackers. Id. Disturbingly, “[t]he potential vulnerability
of cars to hacking will increase as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and self-driving cars
become available” and “the average auto maker is about 20 years behind software
companies in understanding how to prevent cyber attacks.” Id. at 3.
25
Kelly Pleskot, FCA Recalls 1.4 Million Vehicles over Hacking Concern,
MOTORTREND, Jul. 24, 2015, http://www.motortrend.com/news/fca-recalls-1-4million-vehicles-over-hacking-concern/.
26
Craig Timberg, Hacks on the Highway, WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 22, 2015, at 3,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/07/22/hacks-on-thehighway/?utm_term=.f074b322c45a.
27
Id. at 7; Matthew Shaer, Disgruntled Hacker Remotely Disables 100 Cars,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2010, at 1, http://www.csmonitor.com/
Technology/Horizons/2010/0318/ Disgruntled-hacker-remotely-disables-100-cars.
28
Graeme Baker, Schoolboy Hacks into City’s Tram System, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan.
11, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1575293/Schoolboy-hacksinto-citys-tram-system.html.
29
Id.
30
Kim Zetter, How America’s 911 Emergency Response System Can Be Hacked,
WASHINGTON POST: THE SWITCH, Sept. 9, 2016, at 1, https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/09/how-americas-911-emergency-responsesystem-can-be-hacked/?utm_term=.9cfcc5fc5a3d.
31
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Brook, New York.32 The dam was offline for repair and immune to remote
access, but the implications are disturbing because the hackers may have
been trying to access an identically named dam in Oregon, which is a
formidable “245 feet tall and 800 feet long . . . .”33

B. Other Ways the IoT Could Be Hacked
Machine Security researchers have identified a range of other
frightening vulnerabilities. Researchers have “demonstrated ransomware
against home thermostats and exposed vulnerabilities in implanted medical
devices. They’ve hacked voting machines and power plants.”34 Indeed,
many computer security experts fear that the USB port at an airline seat
could potentially be used to control the plane’s avionics.35
Clearly, the IoT offers a broad array of dangerous tools hackers can
employ for a wide range of motives, including: terrorism,36 “national
aggression,”37 pranking,38 election tampering,39 and monetary extortion.40
Whatever the impetus for hacking in the IoT, the threats moving forward
are considerable.

32

Joseph Berger, A Dam, Small and Unsung, Is Caught Up in an Iranian Hacking
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/nyregion/
rye-brook-dam-caught-in-computer-hacking-case.html?_r=0.
33
Id.
34
Schneier, supra note 2, at 5. Although there is evidence of Russian hacking
intended to affect the U.S. presidential election in 2016, these efforts seem to have
been focused on the computers themselves and information contained on them (e.g.,
emails and donor databases), rather than on things connected to the computers, such
as voting machines. But see David Smith & John Swain, Russian Agents Hacked
US Voting System Manufacturer Before U.S. Election, THE GUARDIAN, June 5,
2017, at 1 (noting that although hacking and release of Democratic emails had been
traced to Russia vote counting “was thought to be unaffected” before leaked report
that Russian intelligence hacked into U.S. manufacturer of voting systems weeks
before election).
35
Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 102.
36
See generally Balough, supra note 24, at 1 (theorizing about the possibility that
cars might be exploited for terrorism through the internet).
37
Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 57.
38
See Baker, supra note 28 & 29, and accompanying text (chronicling a hacking
attack executed as a prank).
39
See generally Bruce Schneier, American Elections Will Be Hacked, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/opinion/american-electionswill-be-hacked.html (summarizing the vulnerabilities of voting machines and
infrastructure and the danger of election fraud).
40
See Drew, supra note 23, at 3 (“The primary motivation for [DDoS] attacks
appears to be financial”).
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II. WHY IS THE IOT SO INSECURE AND VULNERABLE TO HACKING?
Security researchers have attributed the scale and ease of attack to
“the quantity of insecure IoT devices operated by a highly distributed set of
unwitting consumers,”41 and to a “fundamental market failure.”42 Because
electronics consumers care most about affordability, “the market has
prioritized features and cost over security.”43 Thus, the teams that make
many IoT devices have less “security expertise” than major companies like
Apple, because “the market won’t stand for the additional costs that [similar
training] would require.”44 Further complicating matters, many IoT devices
are part of a complex global supply chain where they are “designed and
built offshore, then rebranded and resold.”45 The resulting devices are the
product of differing international standards of security.46
As a result, IoT devices in the U.S. exhibit a wide range of serious
vulnerabilities. Many come with “default and easily-identifiable passwords
that hackers can exploit.”47 Some of these passwords cannot be changed.48
Similarly, many “devices also lack the capability of updating their
firmware, forcing consumers to monitor for and install updates
themselves.”49 Additionally, in many cases consumers have little or no way
to know when their IoT devices have been compromised.50 The relationship
between hardware and software further exacerbates the problem. When the
underlying software has been corrupted, the object itself often continues to
function as intended, leaving little reason to replace it.51 Even devices used
as part of a botnet in an attack will “still work fine.”52 Many objects

See Fu, supra note 8, at 4 (“What’s new is the scale and ease of attack because of
the quantity of insecure IoT devices operated by a highly distributed set of
unwitting consumers.”).
42
Schneier, supra note 2, at 3.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Dale Drew Committee on Energy and Commerce, Understanding the Role of
Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks (preliminary transcript), Hearing, pp
37–38 Nov 16, 2016. Available at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/
20161116/105418/HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf; Accessed: 2/26/17
[hereinafter “Drew Testimony”] (explaining the need for international standards).
47
Drew, supra note 23, at 2.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See Fu Testimony, supra note 22, at 88 (using the example of an MRI machine to
explain that consumers do not want to replace functioning hardware to fix a
problem with vulnerable software, especially where the machine is expensive).
52
Schneier, supra note 2, at 4.
41
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connected to the internet continue to serve the function for which
consumers purchased them long after their software becomes insecure.53

III. WHEN IS HACKING THE IOT A CRIME?
This section explores the interaction between the IoT and the
current legal regime. Subsection A discusses whether current laws prohibit
hacking with an intent to control an object. Subsection B explores the
problem of botnets. This section concludes that hacking in the IoT will
often be illegal, though the existing laws punish conduct after the fact
without addressing the vulnerabilities that facilitate hacking.

A. Scenario One: Hacking with the Intention of Controlling an Object
Consider the following hypothetical. Bill has a grudge against his
neighbor Jeremy. Bill discovers a security vulnerability in one of the many
electronic control units (ECUs) of Jeremy’s late model sedan,54 and he
hacks in through the internet and enters commands that enable him to take
control of Jeremy’s car.55
Bill’s actions are increasingly plausible as cars become ever more
connected and automakers struggle to update outmoded software.56 The
hypothetical identifies a fundamental aspect of the IoT: the hackers’ target
is not the computer, but the object connected to the computer. This is true
of many of the examples outlined above, though the motives varied: the
fourteen-year-old hacked a train system for a prank; the Iranians hacked a
dam apparently as an act of terrorism; the extortionists attacked the 911
system for money; and the disgruntled employee hacked into cars sold by
his former employer for revenge. All sought to achieve their goals by
controlling a remotely accessible object in the IoT.57 In the IoT, a major
objective of remote access will be to control the “things.” Thus, a key
question is whether the current legal regime covers this relatively new
threat, governing scenarios like the one involving Bill and Jeremy. It does.
53

Id. at 3–4 (identifying the problem of longevity in internet enabled devices
including cars, refrigerators, and thermostats).
54
Such vulnerabilities are apparently not hard to track down. See Timberg, supra
note 26.
(“[S]ecurity researchers” discovered “readily accessible Internet links to thousands
of other privately owned Jeeps, Dodges and Chryslers . . . .”).
55
The exact form of hacking varies based on the specific ECU: “[s]ome entry
points to a car’s ECUs require a direct hard-wired connection, while others can be
accessed wirelessly, including Wi-Fi or [Radio-frequency identification].” Balough
supra note 24, at 1. Researchers demonstrated that once a vehicle has been started
normally, key functions including the engine, brakes, and transmission can be
controlled remotely by “typing on a MacBook Pro.” Timberg, supra note 26.
56
Timberg, supra note 26.
57
See supra text accompanying notes 27–33.
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1. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The most obvious law that can be employed to combat hacking with
the intent to control an object is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(“CFAA”). The CFAA was “[o]riginally designed as a criminal statute
aimed at deterring and punishing hackers, particularly those who attack
computers used for compelling federal interests,”58 but it also includes “a
trespass-like civil remedy under federal law” for various forms of hacking.59
It is logical that the law would cover hacking with an intent to control an
object, as there is some evidence that Congress passed the CFAA in
response to the movie WarGames,60 where the protagonist accidentally
hacks into the computer controlling America’s nuclear weaponry and nearly
starts a third world war.61
The provisions of the CFAA cover a range of conduct. The Act
prohibits:
(1) unauthorized obtaining of national security information; (2)
unauthorized obtaining of information from a financial institution,
United States department or agency, or from any protected computer;
(3) unauthorized access to government computers; (4) computer fraud;
(5) computer damage; (6) passwords trafficking; and (7) computer
extortion.62

Section 1030(a)(5) is the subsection most likely to cover hacking with an
intent to control an object. It criminalizes:
knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code,
or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing]
damage without authorization, to a protected computer; intentionally
access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result
of such conduct, recklessly caus[ing] damage; or intentionally
58

COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT, SS032 ALI-ABA 993, 995.
5.06. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 1 E-Commerce and Internet Law 5.06
(2016 update).
60
See Fred Kaplan, ‘WarGames’ and Cybersecurity’s Debt to a Hollywood Hack,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2016, at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/movies/
wargames-and-cybersecuritys-debt-to-a-hollywood-hack.html?_r=0 (chronicling
the emergence of early federal cybersecurity laws in response to President Ronald
Reagan’s concern over the movie “WarGames”); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes,
Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 429, 492 (2012).
61
For a synopsis of the movie WarGames, see WarGames, IMDB,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086567/plotsummary?ref_=tt_stry_pl#synopsis (last
visited August 31, 2017).
62
Ioana Vasiu & Lucian Vasiu, Break on Through: An Analysis of Computer
Damage Cases, 14 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL'Y 158, 163 (2014).
59
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access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result
of such conduct, caus[ing] damage and loss.63

Whether §1030(a)(5) prohibits hacking with an intent to control hinges on
four key definitions: (1) “transmission,” (2) “computer,” (3) “protected
computer,” and (4) “damage.”
“Transmission” encompasses a range of hacking activities, such as
“[t]he transfer of operation or confidential information,” “malicious
software updates,” “code injection attacks,” DDoS, and the “embedding of
malicious code” or malware.64 Under the CFAA, transmission “can be
accomplished either over the Internet or through a physical medium such as
a compact disc.”65 This would cover many forms of hacking aimed at
controlling an object. To return to the example of Bill and Jeremy, Bill’s
conduct qualifies, as he transmitted commands via the internet to take
control of Jeremy’s car.
Within the CFAA, “computer” is an expansive term. It is defined as
“an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and
includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related
to or operating in conjunction with such device . . . .”66 As Judge
Easterbrook explained, the definition of “computer” in the CFAA is an
example where the exclusions from the definition “show just how general”
that definition is.67 Indeed, CFAA subsection (e)(1) “carves out automatic
typewriters, typesetters, and handheld calculators; this shows that other
devices with embedded processors and software are covered.”68 Thus, most
IoT devices are computers for purposes of the CFAA. The ECUs that Bill
hacked in Jeremy’s car certainly would qualify, as they “are high speed data
processing devices performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions.”69
Many IoT devices are also protected computers. The CFAA
defines protected computers as not only those “exclusively for the use of a
financial institution or the United States Government” but also computers
that are “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication . . . .”70 Courts have interpreted this definition broadly.
Indeed, in U.S. v. Mitra, Judge Easterbrook explained:

63

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012).
Vasiu, supra note 62, at 167–169.
65
174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (Originally published in 2001).
66
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(1) (2012).
67
United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).
68
Id.
69
Balough supra note 24, at 3.
70
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(2)(b) (2012).
64
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[T]he statute . . . protects computers (and computerized
communication systems) used in such commerce, no matter how the
harm is inflicted. Once the computer is used in interstate commerce,
Congress has the power to protect it from a local hammer blow, or
from a local data packet that sends it haywire.71

This standard included the afflicted computer in Mitra—Madison,
Wisconsin’s “computer-based radio system for police, fire, ambulance, and
other emergency communications”72—even though the hacker’s
“interference did not affect any radio system on the other side of a state
line.”73 What mattered was that Madison’s computerized radio system
“operated on spectrum licensed by the FCC” and therefore implicated
interstate commerce.74
Mitra is not an exception. Particularly relevant for devices that are
part of the IoT, “[c]ourts generally hold that because the Internet and
interstate commerce are inexorably intertwined, any computer connected to
the Internet should be considered a computer affecting interstate commerce
and therefore protected.”75 Thus, if Jeremy’s ECU is internet-enabled, it is
a protected computer under the CFAA. This seems a safe bet in an era
where cars are increasingly connected and can “talk to the outside world
through remote key systems, satellite radios, telematic control units,
Bluetooth connections, dashboard internet links and even wireless tirepressure monitors.”76
“Damage” is “defined as ‘any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information,’”77 and almost
certainly encompasses hacking with the intent of controlling an object.78 To
begin with, a hacker damages a computer under the statute by forcing it to
behave in a manner not intended by its owner.79 Additionally, “[a]dverse
71

Mitra, 405 F.3d at 496.
Id. at 493.
73
Id. at 496.
74
Id.
75
Vasiu, supra note 62, at 164.
76
Timberg, supra note 26.
77
Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of
Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 393, 439
(2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2012)).”
78
As one commentator has summarized it, “nearly any instance of unauthorized
hacking could be said to impair the integrity of a computer system.” Ric Simmons,
The Failure of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Time to Take an Administrative
Approach to Regulating Computer Crime, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1703, 1712
(2016).
79
See Vasiu, supra note 62, at 160 (“Integrity generally refers to maintaining
computer data in a protected state, unaltered by improper, unauthorized or
72
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actions . . . that alter, encrypt, encipher, encode, transmit or delete data or
exhaust system resources” all are damage under the CFAA because they
impair the availability of the computer by making it unusable and
inaccessible.80 Transmission is damage under the CFAA because it
frequently “involves the deletion of computer data or files.”81 Clearly, Bill
damaged Jeremy’s car under the CFAA, since he caused it to behave
contrary to the wishes of its owner.
Finally, CFAA penalties are structured in a manner that enhances
punishment depending on the outcome of the hacking. The Act provides
harsher penalties for those whose hacking causes “physical injury,” “a
threat to public health or safety,” “damage affecting a computer used by or
for an entity of the United States government in furtherance of justice,
national defense, or national security,” damage to at least ten computers
within a year, or “modification or impairment . . . of the medical
examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals . . . .”82
Unsurprisingly, the stiffest retribution is reserved for those who “knowingly
or recklessly caus[e] death from conduct in violation of” subsection
(a)(5)(a).83 Depending on the nature and results of Bill’s hacking, he may
be subject to some of these increased CFAA penalties. For example, if he
took control of Jeremy’s car while it was hurtling down a busy highway, it
is easy to imagine how Bill might have threatened public safety. If
Jeremy’s car crashed as a result of the hacking, Bill would face steeper
sentencing under the CFAA if Jeremy were injured or killed.
There are many other laws that could govern hacking with an intent
to control an object. These include state laws similar to the CFAA.84

subversive conduct or acts contrary to what the system owner or privilege grantor
intended.”).
80
Id.
81
Id. at 192.
82
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4) (2012).
83
18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(F) (2012).
84
Computer Crime Law, 29 (noting all “fifty states . . . enact[ed] statutes
specifically prohibiting computer misuse”). Like the CFAA, all of these laws
employ the “common building block of unauthorized access to a computer,” which
is “usually supplemented by other elements to create additional criminal
prohibitions, such as statutes preventing . . . computer damage.” Id. at 29–30.
Many of these laws could be construed as anti-hacking statutes. Gurney, supra note
77, at 434. And some state computer crime laws prohibit damaging the object for
which control is sought, or other property. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-451(b)
(criminalizing “use [of] a computer or computer network without authority and
with the intent to: … (5) Cause physical injury to the property of another . . . .”).
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B. Scenario Two: Botnets
As discussed in Section I, a botnet is a network of compromised
computers, “often programmed to complete a set of repetitive tasks”
without “the owner's knowledge or permission.”85 Botnets “are the
instrumentality through which substantial amounts of cybercrime takes
place.”86 Botnet-based cybercrime includes spam, fraud, and—of particular
relevance for the IoT—DDoS and the installation of malware.87 Hackers
used a botnet in the Dyn attack, which prompted the HECC hearing
(discussed in Section I) about the dangers of hacking in the IoT.88
By their nature, botnets are illegal under the CFAA.89 For example,
CFAA section 1030(a)(5) criminalizes “knowingly caus[ing] the
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result
of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a
protected computer . . . .”90 Botnets are often created through malicious
software that behaves in this manner.91 Although combating botnets with
laws like the CFAA poses many practical problems,92 there have been some
successful prosecutions.93

IV. PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN BRINGING CFAA
PROSECUTIONS
Although the CFAA is broad enough to reach the hacking in
scenarios one and two, any investigation and prosecution would confront
significant practical and procedural issues—issues that are common to
nearly all computer hacking prosecutions, and not limited to those involving
85

Lerner, supra note 14, at 237–38.
Zachary K. Goldman & Damon McCoy, Deterring Financially Motivated
Cybercrime, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 595, 608 (2016).
87
Lerner, supra note 14, at 237–38.
88
See text accompanying notes 11-23 supra; Bruce Schneier, Lessons From the
Dyn DDoS Attack, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (November 8, 2016, 6:25 AM),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/11/lessons_from_th_5.html.
89
See Kesan supra note 60 at 493 (“The CFAA's language is very broad and can be
read to prohibit the creation of botnets.”).
90
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012).
91
See Kesan, supra note 60 at 442–444 (explaining how botnets are created).
92
See Lerner, supra note 14, at 244 (“CFAA enforcement requires precise
knowledge of the defendant's identity, which is often impossible to obtain in DDoS
attacks . . . [In addition] CFAA prosecution of DDoS masters in foreign countries
is impeded by a number of jurisdictional obstacles.”).
93
See, e.g, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Arizona Man Sentenced
to 30 Months in Prison for Selling Access to Botnets, JUSTICE NEWS (Sept. 15,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/arizona-man-sentenced-30-months-prisonselling-access-botnets (describing successful prosecution of a man who had sold
“access to and use of thousands of malware-infected computers”).
86
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the IoT. First, attribution is very difficult. It poses technical problems and
often requires remote electronic searches. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were amended in 2016 to remove some procedural barriers to
remote electronic searches. But the amendments—and remote searches in
general—have been controversial. As we discuss in more detail below in
subsection B, Critics have voiced a variety of concerns, including Fourth
Amendment and privacy objections. These issues will likely be raised in
prosecutions that rely on evidence secured by means of remote electronic
searches, and there are ongoing efforts to repeal the amendments.
Moreover, when IoT hacking originates outside the United States, those
prosecutions will raise the question whether the CFAA provides for
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Despite all of these difficulties, there have been
some successful investigations, allowing the government to prosecute
hackers and neutralize their botnets.94

A. Attribution
Reliable attribution of most forms of computer hacking is extremely
difficult.95 As Professor Orin Kerr explained, investigating computer
crimes is necessarily different than investigating traditional physical
offenses:
With the physical crime, the chances were good that the crime scene
would yield substantial leads. Even if no one could identify [the
perpetrator] in a lineup, his physical presence at the crime scene
greatly narrowed the number of suspects. The electronic crime scene
looks very different. In most cases, evidence gathered at the victim site
will tell the investigator only that someone, located somewhere in the
world, hacked into the [victim’s computer]. In most cases, the biggest
investigative lead comes in the form of an originating Internet Protocol
(IP) address recorded by the [victim’s] servers. An IP address is the
internet equivalent of a telephone number . . . .96
94

One such success is described in the text accompanying nn.179–88, infra. The
indictment and extradition of Fabio Gasperini, an Italian citizen changed with
creating and running a global botnet, is another. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s
Office, E.D.N.Y., Cybercriminal Who Created Global Botnet Infected with
Malicious Software Extradited to Face Click Fraud Charges (Apr. 21, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/cybercriminal-who-created-global-botnetinfected-malicious-software-extradited-face.
95
See Paul N. Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Prosecuting
Cyberterrorists: Applying Traditional Jurisdictional Frameworks to a Modern
Threat, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 211, 214–15 (2014) (noting the technical
difficulty of attribution).
96
Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 279, 284 (2005). See also Susan W. Brenner, Law, Dissonance, and Remote
Computer Searches, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 43, 46 (2012) (comparing the cybercrime
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Because hackers typically route their attacks through a series of
intermediaries, investigators must “try to follow the trail of electronic bread
crumbs” back to the perpetrator’s computer, a cumbersome process.97
Moreover, hackers intentionally target intermediary computers with lax
security and poor record keeping, meaning that the trail is likely to break
down.98 When that occurs, investigators must use other techniques, such as
prospective surveillance.99
These difficulties are compounded in cases involving multiple
computers. Attribution is especially difficult in the case of crossjurisdictional botnet cases, which may involve one million or more
computers from many nations.100 The perpetrator may be an individual, but
it may also be a business entity or a foreign government agency.101 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation, other U.S. government agencies, and
private organizations are attempting to improve their capacity to meet these
challenges.102 In some cases, the government has collaborated with the
private sector.103
Anonymizing technology adds another layer to this already
complicated attribution problem. For example, Tor is a private global
computer network that allows users to conduct anonymous transactions
without revealing their location.104 As one commentator explained:
Computers on the Tor Network use an encrypted communications
protocol that cannot be accessed using normal web browsers. Instead,
they require the use of special software, like the Tor Browser. Proper
use of the Tor Network makes it practically impossible for
investigations with traditional investigations and noting that a computer hacker may
be hundreds or even thousands of miles away from the victim, unseen by and
unknown to him or her).
97
Kerr, supra note 96, at 285.
98
Id. at 286.
99
Id.
100
E.g., Stockton & Golabek-Goldman, supra note 95, at 214 (describing DDOS
attack on Estonia involving one million slave computers in countries from Vietnam
to the United States).
101
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr & Sean D. Murphy, Government Hacking to Light the
Dark Web: What Risks to International Relations and International Law, 70 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 58, 58 (describing hacking by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean
governments).
102
Id. at 214–15.
103
See Garrett M. Graff, How the FBI Took Down Russia’s Spam King—and His
Massive Botnet, WIRED, April 11, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/04/fbi-tookrussias-spam-king-massive-botnet/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (describing outside
security researchers and FBI agents).
104
Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction
on the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1087 (2017).
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governments to trace the location of computers hosting “hidden”
websites on the network, the location of computers accessing those
hidden websites, or the location of computers that tunnel through the
network to “anonymously” visit public websites on the World Wide
Web.105

Tor bounces message packets through a series of intermediate computers
(proxies) scattered around the globe, making it impossible for government
investigators to determine the location of the original sender.106

B. Remote Electronic Searches
When a physical search is not possible because anonymizing
technology has hidden the location of electronic storage media, the
government may be able to conduct a remote electronic search of the media
to seize or copy electronically stored information. Although searches of this
nature are a common feature of hacking investigations, they raise a variety
of ethical and legal issues. Some of the issues were addressed in 2016 by
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These
amendments generated substantial controversy, and the constitutional issues
raised by critics of remote searches will need to be resolved on a case-bycase basis when warrant applications are presented for judicial approval or
evidence obtained by the use of such warrants is introduced at trial. And
some commentators have urged Congress to limit remote electronic
searches.
Remote electronic searches employ network investigative
techniques (NITs) that allow investigators to reach a computer without
knowledge of its physical location.107 A remote search requires only a
means of communicating with the target computer, such as an active email
address.108 For example, an NIT may be an email containing software that
can extract from the target computer and relay back information such as the
target computer’s IP address, its host name, media access control (MAC)
address, time zone, and registered computer name, registered company
name, and current logged-in user name.109 The government has employed
105

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 1088.
107
Id. at 1096. For a description of the NIT, see United States v. Croghan, 209
F.Supp.3d 1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 2016). For a general description of NITs, see
Devin M. Adams, The 2016 Amendments to Criminal Rule 41: National Search
Warrants to Seize Cyberspace, “Particularly” Speaking, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 727,
737–41 (2017).
108
Id.
109
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski to Judge John F. Keenan,
Chair, Subcommittee on Rule 41, Jan. 17, 2014, Attachment B, April 2014 Agenda
Book Advisory Comm. Crim. Rules 179, 187, available at
106
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other NITs as well.110 Although the lower courts have been divided on this
issue, several courts have concluded that NITs constitute searches for the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment when the government obtains
information (such as the defendant's IP address) not from a third party
provider, but rather from an intrusion into the defendant's computer.111
In 2014, the Department of Justice recommended that the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules amend the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to “update the provisions relating to the
territorial limits for searches of electronic storage media.”112 The
Department sought amendments to deal with “two increasingly common
situations (1) where the warrant sufficiently describes the computer to be
searched but the district within which that computer is located is unknown,
and (2) where the investigation requires law enforcement to coordinate
searches of numerous computers in numerous districts.”113 Additionally, the
Department noted that the provisions for notice following a search had not
been adapted to address remote searches.114
The Department explained that when persons committing criminal
offenses have used anonymizing technology, like Tor, the territorial limits
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 could prevent the issuance of
warrants for remote searches although the government had met all of the

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committeerules-criminal-procedure-november-2014.
110
For example, after the government seized the server for the “Playpen” child
pornography website, it obtained a warrant to install an NIT on the server
consisting of software to be deployed when any user logged into the site with a
username and password, regardless of the user’s physical location. The NIT would
then force the “activating” computer to transmit information back to the FBI,
including: the IP address of the activating computer; the date and time the NIT
determined the IP address; a unique identifier generated by the NIT to distinguish
data from different activating computers; the type of operating system running on
the activating computer, including type, version, and architecture; information on
whether the NIT had already been delivered to the activating computer; the “host
name” of the activating computer; the operating system used by the activating
computer; and the Media Access Control (“MAC”) address of the activating
computer.
111
E.g., United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 2017); Adams,
supra note 107, at 755–57 (collecting cases).
112
Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to The
Honorable Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules 1 (Sept.
18, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/suggestions/honmythili-raman-13-cr-b [hereinafter Raman letter].
113
Id.
114
Id. at 4.
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other constitutional and statutory requirements. With certain exceptions,115
prior to the 2016 amendment Rule 41 authorized “a magistrate judge with
authority in a district” to issue warrants to search for and seize “property
located within the district.”116 But anonymizing technology like Tor
disguises the location of the storage media or information to be searched.
Thus under a strict reading of the rule, disguising the district in which the
computer was located precluded any court from issuing a warrant, even if
the government had presented probable cause and met all of the other
statutory and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant.117
The government would be unable to obtain venue in any district, regardless
of the seriousness of the offense.118
The venue or territorial limitation for the issuance of warrants also
imposed a particularly heavy burden in botnet investigations, where the
affected computers (and other IoT devices that would be classed as
computers under the CFAA) are often located in all ninety-four federal
districts. Although the information establishing probable cause would be
virtually identical in each district, presenting this information in each

115

Before amendment, Rule 41(b) authorized search warrants for property located
outside the judge’s district in only four situations: (1) for property in the district that
might be removed before execution of the warrant; (2) for tracking devices installed
in the district, which may be monitored outside the district; (3) for investigations of
domestic or international terrorism; and (4) for property located in a U.S. territory
or a U.S. diplomatic or consular mission. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)-(5).
116
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1).
117
Raman letter at 2, citing In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises
Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2013).
118
For example, in describing the need for the Rule 41 amendments, Assistant
Attorney General Leslie Caldwell wrote of the dismissal of prosecutions of users of
the Playpen site, which allowed pedophiles to trade images and videos of child sex
exploitation:
Despite being prepared to comply fully with the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirements, including persuading a federal judge that a lawful
basis for a warrant exists, investigators are being told that, because
criminals have successfully used technology to hide their location, there is
no court available to hear their warrant application. Unless that
nonsensical outcome is addressed, cases such as Playpen fail, meaning
that pedophiles – including hands-on abusers – will be free to continue
their crimes.
Leslie R. Caldwell, Ensuring Tech-Savy Criminals Do Not Have Immunity from
Investigation, U.S. Dept’t Justice (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/opa/blog/ensuring-tech-savvy-criminals-do-not-have-immunityinvestigation.
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district would impose a heavy burden both on the investigators seeking the
warrants and on the courts reviewing those warrants in each district.119
Finally, before amendment, the notice provisions of Rule 41 were
ill-adapted to remote electronic searches.120 The rule required the officer
executing the warrant to give a copy of the warrant and receipt for any
property seized “to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the
property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant or receipt at the place
where the officer took the property.”121 This language seemed to
contemplate leaving the warrant and receipt at a physical place, which
would not be feasible for remote electronic searches.
After a period of notice and comment on proposed revisions,122 and
a public hearing123 on draft amendments, the Advisory Committee proposed
amendments to Rule 41 that addressed the problems with venue and made
explicit provision for the notice to be provided after remote electronic
searches.124 When “technological means,” such as Tor, had been used to
conceal the location of the media or information, the proposed amendment
authorized the issuance of a warrant by “a magistrate judge with authority in
any district where activities related to the crime may have occurred.”125
Additionally, in CFAA investigations under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), such as
botnet investigations, the amendment authorized the government to seek a
single warrant when protected computers had been damaged in five or more
districts.126 Finally, the amendment added a new provision regarding notice
for remote electronic searches, which required the officer conducting the
search to “make reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant and
receipt on the person whose property was searched or who possessed the
information that was seized or copied.”127 It also allowed service to be
119

Raman letter at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
121
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C).
122
See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (posted
Aug. 14, 2015) (providing proposed amendments and seeking comments between
August 15, 2014 and February 17, 2015) https://www.regulations.gov/docket?
D=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004.
123
See Transcript of Proceedings, Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules,
Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., Wash.,
D.C., Nov. 5, 2014, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/recordsand-archives-rules-committees/transcripts-and-testimony.
124
Comm. on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of the Advisory Comm.
on Criminal Rules, (May 6, 2015), in Final Materials for Congress 23, 24
[hereinafter Final Materials for Congress], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
document/2016-04-28-final-package-congress.
125
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A).
126
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(B).
127
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C).
120
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“accomplished by any means, including electronic means, reasonably
calculated to reach that person.”128
After review by the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure,
the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, the proposed amendments
were submitted to Congress,129 which took no action and allowed them to
go into effect December 1, 2016.130
The amendments have generated substantial opposition. Although
a variety of other concerns were also raised during the public notice and
comment period,131 “[t]he most common theme in the comments opposing
the amendments was a concern that they relaxed or undercut the protections
for personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”132 Critics
expressed concern that warrants issued pursuant to the proposed rules would
not meet the particularity and notice requirements, would be exceptionally
intrusive, destructive, and dangerous, and yet largely insulated from judicial
review.133 Several commentators urged that changes of this nature were not
appropriate for rulemaking because they raised policy issues that should be
resolved by Congress.134 Finally, some commentators also urged that the
amendments would improperly allow extraterritorial searches in violation of

128

Id.
See Final Materials for Congress at 201-249 (providing Chief Justice John
Roberts’ transmittals of proposed amendments to Rule 41 to Congress, Judicial
Conference’s transmittal of amendments to the Supreme Court, and excerpts from
the Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to the Standing
Committee on Practice and Procedure).
130
See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114TH CONG., 2D SESSION, FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RULE 41 (Comm. Print 2016).
131
For summaries of the comments, see Adams, supra note 107, at 746–48 (noting
opponents portrayed amendment as “a substantive expansion on the government's
investigative authority, which raised a number of emphatic constitutional, legal, and
geopolitical concerns”); Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, Reporters, Memo to the
Members, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Feb. 25, 2015, at 4–18, in
Agenda Book, Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules, March 16-17, 2015, at 87, 90-104,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory
-committee-rules-criminal-procedure-may-2015 (describing concerns about (1) the
Fourth Amendment, (2) the effect on the use of virtual private networks (VPNs)
and anonymizing technology, (3) forum shopping, (4) tension or conflict with the
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Title III), (5) extraterritorial searches, (6) the
potential for collateral damage, (7) searches of victim computers, and (8) intrusions
into the constitutional and statutory rights of the media).
132
Id. at 4.
133
Id. at 4–10.
134
Id. at 15.
129
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international law.135 Similar concerns were later raised by Senator Ron
Wyden and several other members of Congress.136
The Advisory Committee concluded that these constitutional and
policy arguments raised substantive issues that were not germane to its task
under the Rules Enabling Act,137 and should be resolved by the courts on a
case-by-case basis, or by Congress. The Department of Justice had brought
to the Committee’s attention a procedural problem that was impairing its
ability to investigate serious computer crimes. In the Committee’s view, its
task was to remove a barrier created by the Rules (not the Constitution), and
to allow the courts to rule on constitutional issues if (and when) they were
raised by particular warrant applications.138 The amendment would
facilitate judicial review and the development of applicable constitutional
standards by allowing the government to seek warrants, rather than
conducting exigent warrantless searches.139 Broad policy questions—such
as whether additional non-constitutional limitations should be imposed on
135

Id. at 13–15.
See Markus Rauschecker, Rule 41 Amendments Provide for a Drastic Expansion
of Government Authority to Conduct Computer Searches and Should Not Have
Been Adopted by the Supreme Court, 76 MD. L. REV. 1085, 1091–92 (2017)
(describing congressional opposition).
137
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).
138
See HONORABLE REENA RAGGI, ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, 13–14
(2015) [hereinafter Committee Report] (explaining Committee’s view that “Venue
is not substance. Venue is process, and the Rules Enabling Act tells the judiciary to
promulgate rules of practice and procedure, not to wait for Congress to act,” and
expressing the Committee’s confidence “judges will address Fourth Amendment
requirements on a case-by-case basis both in issuing warrants under these
amendments and in reviewing them when challenges are made thereafter.”);
ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, Minutes from Meeting on March 16-17,
2015 in Orlando, Florida, 3–8 (2015) [hereinafter Minutes] (statements by Rule 41
Subcommittee chair and members characterizing many of the objections to the
amendments as substantive, not procedural, noting Committee’s responsibility
under the Rules Enabling Act to address new procedural problem (such as the
venue gap), and observing that providing venue for warrant applications would
allow caselaw on the constitutional issues to develop in an orderly fashion,
shedding light on the issues should Congress wish to legislate). The Advisory
Committee addressed this point in the Committee Note, which provides:
The amendment does not address constitutional questions, such as the
specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may require in a
warrant for remotely searching electronic storage media or seizing or
copying electronically stored information, leaving the application of this
and other constitutional standards to ongoing case law development.
136

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6), 2016 Committee Note.
139
Minutes at 5 (comments of Judge Raggi and Judge Kethledge), 6 (comments of
Judge Sutton).
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remote searches to protect privacy—are substantive, not procedural, and
accordingly they would fall outside the rulemaking authority conferred by
the Rules Enabling Act. Congress would be the appropriate body to weigh
the competing policy concerns and consider whether legislation should be
enacted.140 Finally, the Committee was not persuaded by the argument that
the amendment would authorize the courts to issue extraterritorial searches
in violation of international law.141
Post-amendment scholarship has renewed and developed more fully
the Fourth Amendment issues,142 and produced a debate about whether Rule
41 authorizes searches that raise foreign relations and international law
concerns. One recent article argued that searches authorized by the
amendments to Rule 41 violate other nations’ sovereignty, which offends
customary international law and disrupts foreign relations.143 But other
140

See Committee Report at 13–14 (noting that many of the objections to the
proposed amendments “were about substantive limits on government searches,
which are not affected by the proposed amendment”); Minutes at 3, 5 (comments of
Judge Kethledge) (subcommittee chair’s characterization of many objections to the
amendments as substantive, not procedural), 6 (comments of Judge Sutton) (noting
that approving venue for searches was not approving remote electronic searches;
rather, it permits litigation “that will shed light on the process and the issues,” and
noting that under the Rules Enabling Act the judiciary’s role is to promulgate rules,
to which Congress reacts).
141
See Raman letter at 4–5 (citations omitted), stating:
In light of the presumption against international extraterritorial
application, and consistent with the existing language of Rule 41(b)(3),
this amendment does not purport to authorize courts to issue warrants that
authorize the search of electronic storage media located in a foreign
country or countries. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches
of the property of non-United States persons outside the United States,
and the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply to
searches of United States persons outside the United States. Instead,
extraterritorial searches of United States persons are subject to the Fourth
Amendment's "basic requirement of reasonableness." Under this proposed
amendment, law enforcement could seek a warrant either where the
electronic media to be searched are within the United States or where the
location of the electronic media is unknown. In the latter case, should the
media searched prove to be outside the United States, the warrant would
have no extraterritorial effect, but the existence of the warrant would
support the reasonableness of the search.
142

See Rauschecker, supra note 136, at 1095–1100 (arguing that the amendment
allows searches that will violate the Fourth Amendment and greatly expand the
government’s investigative authority); Adams, supra note 107, at 753–72
(proposing a Fourth Amendment framework for courts considering remote access
warrants).
143
See Ghappour, supra note 104.
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scholars disagreed, noting “the pervasive nature of transnational law
enforcement cooperation generally and the existing practice of government
cooperation and coordination in dark web investigations specifically,” and
challenging the claim that the use of NITs in this context would violate
international law.144
The law governing remote electronic searches is still in its infancy.
Because Rule 41(b)(6) now provides venue for remote electronic searches,
it has opened the courthouse door not only to applications seeking these
warrants, but also to litigation challenging particular searches on
constitutional grounds. This litigation will allow the development of
precedents that will clarify—and may limit—remote electronic searches.
There may also be legislative developments. Bills have been introduced in
both houses to repeal the amendments to Rule 41,145 and Congress may
eventually develop a framework to regulate remote electronic searches, as it
did with wiretaps.146 The imposition of additional limits on remote searches
could have a significant impact on the government’s ability to prosecute
hacking, given the practical necessity to use remote searches to identify
hackers.

C. Jurisdiction to Prosecute Extraterritorial Conduct
If hacking originates outside the United States, it raises the question
of whether the CFAA has extraterritorial reach. Unlike some other federal
statutes,147 the CFAA does not expressly confer jurisdiction over conduct
that occurred outside the United States. It is well established that the United
States exercises jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to conduct that occurs
within its territory,148 and U.S. statutes are presumed to apply in United
144

See Kerr & Murphy, supra note 101, at 61.
Stop Mass Hacking Act, S. 406, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017); Stop Mass
Hacking Act, H.R. 1110, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017).
146
Cf. Minutes at 6 (comments of Prof. Beale) (noting that as in the case of Title II,
Congress enacted limitations on wire taps after case law shed light on the policy
issues).
147
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over money
laundering if the transactions involve more than $10,000 and the conduct is by a
U.S. citizen or by a non-U.S. citizen in the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a)
(providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over several trafficking offenses if the
alleged offender is a national of the United States or a permanent resident alien, or
“the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality
of the alleged offender.”)
148
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES: JURISDICTION § 201(1)(a), comment E (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No.
2, 2017) (approved May 22, 2017). See also Diane Marie Amann, Jurisdictional,
Preliminary, and Procedural Concerns, AM SOC’Y INT’L L, www.asil.org/bench
book/jurisdiction.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).
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States territory.149 Although the U.S. also recognizes prescriptive
extraterritorial jurisdiction based upon nationality, active and passive
personality, the protective principle, and universal jurisdiction,150 the
question whether a particular crime will have extraterritorial application
must be determined by the courts. This determination is subject to a
presumption in favor of domestic application of U.S. laws and against
extraterritoriality. In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has
reemphasized and strengthened the presumption against extraterritoriality,
raising the question whether the CFAA will be construed to have
extraterritorial effect.
1. Statutory Construction and Extraterritoriality
In United States v. Bowman, a decision from 1922, the Supreme
Court indicated that some offenses are not subject to the presumption
against extraterritorial application. The Court recognized that crimes
“affect[ing] the peace and good order of the community,” such as murder,
robbery, and arson, are presumed to be territorial.151 Other crimes, however,
are “not logically dependent on their locality for the government’s
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated,” and they
are not presumed to be territorial.152 In the intervening decades, that lower
courts understood Bowman to mean “a substantial number of . . . crimes
operate overseas by virtue of the implicit intent of Congress.”153
Recent decisions in the Supreme Court have tightened the rules of
statutory interpretation, restricting access to the federal courts in civil cases
involving extraterritorial conduct and casting doubt on the continuing
vitality of Bowman. In two major civil cases, Kiobel154 and Morrison155 the
Court instructed the federal courts to apply a strong presumption against
149

Id.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (AM.
LAW INST. 1987); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES: JURISDICTION § 101 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3,
2017) (approved May 22, 2017).
151
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
152
Id.
153
Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., No. 94-166, Extraterritorial Application
of American Criminal Law 19–20 (2016). See also S. Nathan Williams, Note, The
Sometimes “Craven Watchdog”: The Disparate Criminal-Civil Application of the
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 63 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1395 (2014) (stating
“courts have found that some crimes are so inherently transnational as to deserve
the blessing of the Bowman exception. Typical crimes in this . . . category include
trafficking (human or drug) and racketeering.”).
154
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013).
155
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010).
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extraterritoriality: absent a clearly expressed congressional intent to the
contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic
application.156 In justifying this presumption, the Court emphasized the need
to avoid international discord157 or friction, as well as the “common sense”
view that Congress ordinarily focuses on domestic matters.158
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Bowman,
it is doubtful whether that case is still good law. Initially, many courts and
commentators concluded that Bowman had not been overruled or limited.159
But the Court’s decision in a RJR Nabisco v. European Community,160 a
civil suit brought under the Racketeering and Corrupt Organization (RICO)
Act,161 cast serious doubt on the Supreme Court’s continued adherence to
Bowman. The Court first considered the question whether the criminal
provisions of RICO itself (and various federal crimes that are RICO
predicate offenses) have extraterritorial effect.162 The Court drew no
distinction between civil and criminal statutes. In determining the reach of
these offenses, the Court applied the presumption against exterritorial
effect, citing its prior decisions in civil cases.163 It stated:
The question is not whether we think “Congress would have wanted” a
statute to apply to foreign conduct “if it had thought of the situation
before the court,” but whether Congress has affirmatively and
unmistakably instructed that the statute will do so. When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has
none.”164

The Court did not discuss or even cite the Bowman decision, but this
passage can be read as repudiating the Bowman approach. As one
commentator stated, “the Court seemed to take direct aim at Bowman
without naming it,”165 and the American Law Institute’s Restatement of
Foreign Relations (Fourth) treats the presumption against extraterritoriality
as fully applicable to criminal statutes.166
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Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261.
Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117.
158
RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016).
159
Doyle, supra note 153, at 10, n.45 (collecting cases).
160
Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2093.
161
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970).
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Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2099–2106.
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Id. at 2100–01.
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Id. at 2100 (citations omitted).
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Doyle, supra note 153, at 10.
166
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES: JURISDICTION § 203 reps. notes 1, 4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
3) (approved May 22, 2017) (describing evolution of presumption, drawing no
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2. Construing the CFAA
The CFAA would be severely hamstrung if it were not applicable to
foreign-based hacking, and there is some evidence that Congress intended
the CFAA to have extraterritorial application. But it is not clear whether the
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Congress “clearly and
unmistakably” directed that result. Thus, the CFAA could provide the test
case to determine whether the strong presumption developed in civil cases
will be applied with the same rigor in construing criminal statutes,
particularly those involving crimes that inherently cross borders. The
balance of interests may be calculated differently in civil and criminal cases,
since the Executive Branch, which controls foreign relations, is also
responsible for the discretionary determination whether to prosecute cases
that may have foreign relations implications.
Only one district court has considered whether the CFAA provides
for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and that decision predated the Supreme
Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco. In United States v. Ivanov167 the
defendant, who was physically in Russia, hacked into the computer system
of a financial-transaction clearinghouse using an internet service provider
located in the state of Washington. Noting the detrimental effect of the
conduct occurred in the United States,168 the court concluded it had subject
matter jurisdiction and turned to the question whether the CFAA provided
for extraterritorial jurisdiction. It recognized the presumption against
extraterritoriality, but found that Congress “clearly manifested its intention”
to give the CFAA extraterritorial effect.169
The Ivanov court focused on several changes made by Congress in
1996. Although the changes to the text focused on defining which
computers were protected and what conduct was prohibited, the legislative
history indicates the Senate was concerned about foreign-based hackers. As
the Ivanov court noted, the 1996 amendments revised the definition of
“protected computer” to include a computer used in “foreign commerce or
communication,” added subsections dealing with “interstate or foreign
commerce,” and defined the term “government entity” to include foreign
governments.170 Foreign commerce, in this context, “must mean
international” commerce.171 The legislative history, moreover, suggests that
Congress intended the CFAA to apply to foreign-based hackers. As the
court noted, the Senate Judiciary Committee “specifically noted its concern
distinction between civil and criminal or private and public enforcement, and
concluding Bowman can be read to be consistent with more recent cases).
167
United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368–69 (D. Conn. 2001).
168
Id. at 370–73.
169
Id. at 373, 375.
170
Id. at 374.
171
Id.
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that . . . hackers are often foreign-based,” and cited two specific instances of
foreign-based hackers as examples of the kind of cases that the amendments
were intended to address.172
Under the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on extraterritorial
jurisdiction, it is not clear whether other courts will follow Ivanov. On the
one hand, courts construing the CFAA will be well aware that construing it
to apply only to conduct that occurs in the United States would severely
limit its effectiveness. However, it is doubtful whether a brief passage from
a committee report constitutes an affirmative and unmistakable instruction
that the CFAA should be applied to extraterritorial conduct, as well as to
computers engaged in foreign commerce or and communication, including
protected computers located outside the United States.173 Thus a challenge
to the CFAA’s jurisdiction could provide a test for the criminal applicability
of the most restrictive language in RJR Nabisco.174
Some scholars of international law have expressed concern that
extraterritorial hacking prosecutions may violate international law,175 and
those concerns might trigger the application of two other rules of statutory
construction in CFAA prosecutions. First, the federal courts apply the socalled Charming Betsy principle that “an act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains.”176 This principle is applied, however, only when a construction
avoiding such a conflict is “fairly possible.”177 But when such a
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Id., citing S. Rep. No. 357, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996).
See also Doyle, supra note 153, at 6–7, 33–35 (noting the question whether 18
U.S.C. 1030(a)(3), which criminalizes access to government computers, is
applicable to extraterritorial conduct).
174
One factor that might affect the courts’ response, at least at the margins, is a
perception that concerns about interference with U.S. foreign relations should be
less important in criminal than in civil cases. Private civil claimants may neither
know, nor care about, the possible diplomatic and foreign relations problems their
case may generate. In contrast, the Executive Branch has responsibility for both
foreign affairs and the enforcement of criminal laws. In cases involving the
interests of other nations—such as the prosecution of foreign-based hackers—the
Executive can weigh any foreign relations or foreign policy concerns in exercising
prosecutorial discretion. However, because the CFAA does create a private right of
action for civil damages, any extraterritorial interpretation would apply to civil
cases as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012) (authorizing civil actions for
“compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief).
175
See, e.g., Stockton & Golabek-Goldman, supra note 95 (analyzing international
law grounds for extraterritorial jurisdiction applied to cyberterrorism).
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Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
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See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES: JURISDICTION § 205 reps. notes 1, 4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
173

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

188

construction is not fairly possible, the intent of Congress—rather than
international law—governs, and “the federal statute is controlling as a
matter of law.”178 The Supreme Court has also twice invoked the canon of
“constru[ing] ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with
the sovereign authority of other nations.”179

D. Success Against the Odds
Despite the practical and legal difficulties, there have been some
successful efforts to prosecute and disrupt hacking, the most recent of which
involved the use of the Rule 41 amendments.
In April 2017, the Department of Justice announced “an extensive
effort to disrupt and dismantle the Kelihos botnet,” which it described as “a
global network of tens of thousands of infected computers under the control
of a cybercriminal that was used to facilitate malicious activities including
harvesting login credentials, distributing hundreds of millions of spam emails, and installing ransomware and other malicious software.”180
Pursuant to amended Rule 41, the Department of Justice had obtained a
single warrant authorizing it to “redirect Kelihos-infected computers to a
substitute server and to record the Internet Protocol addresses of those
computers as they connect to the server.” 181 This allowed “the government
to provide the IP addresses of Kelihos victims to those who can assist with
removing the Kelihos malware including internet service providers.”182
Some critics of the Rule 41 amendments were impressed that the
government had been protective of individual privacy: it collected only the
victims’ IP addresses and “non-content” routing and signaling information
so Internet Service Providers could notify the victims. 183 Moreover, the
court order “limited the government’s interactions with victimized
computers to commands that block an infected computer from performing
malicious activities and communicating with other devices on the botnets,”
which prohibits the government from seizing any of the contents of victim
3) (approved, May 22, 2017); Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
178
Id.
179
F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). This
canon has not, however, been invoked by the Court since its 2007 holding in
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007).
180
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Actions to Dismantle Kelihos
Botnet, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/justice-department-announces-actions-dismantle-kelihos-botnet-0.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
Aliya Sternstein, FBI Allays Some Critics with First Use of New Mass-Hacking
Warrant, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/
04/fbi-allays-some-critics-with-first-use-of-new-mass-hacking-warrant/.
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computers.184 But other commentators were critical of the government’s
efforts because they involved invading the victim computers to take
corrective actions.185 To permanently disable the Kelihos botnet, the
government had to prevent the victim computers from communicating with
other hacker-controlled devices.186
The government also collected sufficient information to attribute
the Kelihos botnet to Russian hacker Peter Yuryevish Levashov, who was
indicted for CFAA violations and other related charges.187 In an ironic twist
of fate, government investigators finally linked Levashov to the botnet
because he had committed the same security lapse that allows
cybercriminals to victimize innocent consumers: using the same IP and
login credentials on various consumer sites, including Apple and Google.188
With the cooperation of Spanish authorities, Levashov was arrested in Spain
while on holiday, the National Court of Spain ruled that he could be
extradited, and he was brought to the United States in February 2018.189

V. LEGALIZING HACKING BACK AGAINST BOTNETS
Although the CFAA provides a tool to prosecute hacking in the IoT,
given the difficulties implicit in bringing prosecutions under it, other
solutions are needed to address the dangers posed by the IoT. This section
discusses one such possible solution: remedial action.190 Although
184

Id.
See, e.g., Tim Cushing, FBI Tries New Rule 41 Changes on Size in Fight Against
Long-Running Botnet for Size, TECHDIRT (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.tech
dirt.com/articles/20170411/09411837126/fbi-tries-new-rule-41-changes-size-fightagainst-long-running-botnet.shtml.
186
See Sternstein, supra note 183 (quoting security expert involved in Kelihos
cleanup who explained that because of the peer-to-peer nature of this botnet, “the
FBI ‘had to infect machines,’ convert them into so-called supernodes that distribute
connection lists to other victimized computers, and then ‘poison’ all the computers
so they would never again try to communicate with hacker-controlled devices”).
187
Garrett M. Graff, How the FBI Took Down Russia’s Spam King, WIRED (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/fbi-took-russias-spam-king-massivebotnet/.
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Id.
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See Andrew Blake, Foreign Courts OK Extradition of Russians Charged in U.S.
Cybercrime Probes, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washington
times.com/news/2017/oct/4/peter-levashov-and-alexander-vinnik-russians-charg/
(describing Spanish court’s approval of extradition to the United States); U.S.
Department of Justice, Alleged Operator of Kelihos Botnet Extradited From Spain,
Feb. 2, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alleged-operator-kelihos-botnetextradited-spain.
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We use the term “hacking back” to refer to invasive counterattacks. We use the
term “remedial action” to denote the broader category of self-help measures which
hacking back is a part of.
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remedial actions might sometimes be useful when hackers seek to control
an object as discussed in Section III.A., we will focus here on their potential
to reduce the threat posed by botnets, where such efforts would have the
greatest utility. It is a controversial route, mired in legal, ethical, and
practical dilemmas. This section begins by discussing the danger of
botnets, the potential benefit of hacking back, and the legal barriers to doing
so. It then assesses how hacking back may be legalized, before
summarizing some of its primary critiques.

A. The Danger of Botnets and the Allure of Hacking Back
The Botnets have a different relationship to the IoT than many of
the other dangers discussed in this article. Much of this article focuses on
how the internet may be used to corrupt devices connected to it.191 In
contrast, botnets present the reverse issue: devices connected to the internet
may be used to disrupt the internet itself.192 Compounding the problem,
botnets are not only an existential threat to the internet but a persistent one
as well. Without curative solutions, botnets can be used in multiple
crimes.193 Once a device is recruited into a botnet, it becomes part of a
“commodity” that can be rented out “by the hour” or purchased.194
Thus, to eliminate the threat of botnets, a solution with retroactive
and curative force is needed. Enter hacking back, part of a larger concept of
internet self help or remediation encompassing terms such as counterstrikes,
“‘active defense,’ ‘back hacking,’ ‘retaliatory hacking,’ or ‘offensive
countermeasures’”195 As the assorted terms suggest, remedial action
encompasses a range of different self-help measures to prevent and counter
botnets and hacking. Remedial actions might “enable attacked parties to
detect, trace, and then actively respond to a threat by, for example,
interrupting an attack in progress to mitigate damage to the system.”196
Specific strategies could include implementing a “DoS attack at the botnet
controller or hacking the botnet controller and thereby taking control of the
botnet.”197 However, not all remedial efforts are so forceful: “Hacking back
191

See discussion supra Section I.A.
See supra notes 11–19 and accompanying text (describing the role of botnets in
the Dyn attack which disrupted several leading websites).
193
One illustration of the resilience of botnets can be found in Microsoft and
Europol’s attempt to dismantle the ZeroAccess botnet: despite taking down portions
of the botnet it was revived within months. Goldman, supra note 86, at 610.
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Janine S. Hiller, Civil Cyberconflict: Microsoft, Cybercrime, and Botnets, 31
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 168–69 (2015).
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Sean L. Harrington, Cyber Security Active Defense: Playing with Fire or Sound
Risk Management?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, at *4 (2014). See Kesan, supra note
60, at 434 (using the terms “hack back” and “counterstrike”).
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Id. at 475.
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against a botnet can be as simple and nonaggressive as pushing security
patches onto infected computers, just as patients with a deadly virus could
be forcibly treated or quarantined to prevent a contagion’s spread.”198
Unlike enforcement and litigation which do little to prevent future attacks,
and are “inherently ex post facto,”199 hacking back has the crucial ability to
prevent future attacks by combatting existing botnets.
Despite these potential benefits, there is also a potential problem. At
least if undertaken by private parties,200 such behaviors may be illegal.201
Ironically, “[t]he same laws that make it illegal to hack in the first place—
for instance, to access someone else’s system without authorization—
presumably make it illegal to hack back.”202 The CFAA both criminalizes
botnets and limits recourse against them.203 The Department of Justice, the
FBI, and “White House officials” have all suggested that such remedial
efforts may be illegal.204 Scholarship echoes this conclusion.205 As a result,
the legal regime that is intended to protect the public from hacking also
limits the manner in which such dangers may be fought. A logical question
then, is how hacking back might be legalized.206

B. Possible Theories for the Legalization of Hacking Back
There are a variety of ways in which hacking back might be
legalized. This subsection focuses primarily on one possibility: creating
exceptions for strikebacks through a legal framework modeled on the laws
governing recapture of property. It then briefly summarizes other
possibilities.
Recapture laws provide a promising framework for remedial action.
They balance two conflicting considerations implicated by hacking back:
the right to protect personal property, and the understanding that that right
cannot be absolute. On the one hand, “[t]he law has always recognized that
a person is justified in using some degree of force to protect his property
Patrick Lin, Ethics of Hacking Back, U.S. NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2016),
http://ethics.calpoly.edu/hackingback.pdf.
199
See Kesan, supra note 60, at 474.
200
For a discussion of the government’s use of remedial measures to neutralize the
Kelihos botnet, see supra notes 174–80 and accompanying text.
201
See Kesan, supra note 60, at 475 (“Even though counterstrikes are currently of
questionable legality . . . .”).
202
Lin, supra note 198, at 6.
203
Id. (identifying CFAA as a law contributing to this paradox).
204
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205
See Harrington, supra note 195, at *17 (“[T]here is little debate that affirmative
retaliatory hacking is unlawful . . .”).
206
Some less aggressive remedial actions may be legal. Although a full review is
beyond the scope of this paper, for a summary, see id. at *9–*16.
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from wrongful invasion or appropriation by another.”207 On the other, the
law has been wary of the dangers surrounding self-help measures to regain
property.208
The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides an important compromise
of these conflicting interests in the context of recaption of property. Under
MPC 3.06(1)(b), “use of force upon or toward the person of another” when
protecting property is justifiable if:
[T]he actor believes that such force is immediately necessary . . . to
effect an entry or re-entry upon land or to retake tangible movable
property provided that the actor believes that he or the person by
whose authority he acts or a person from whom he or such other
person derives title was unlawfully dispossessed of such land or
movable property and is entitled to possession, and provided, further,
that:
(i) the force is used immediately or on fresh pursuit after such
dispossession; or
(ii) the actor believes that the person against whom he uses force
has no claim of right to the possession of the property and, in the
case of land, the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be,
are of such urgency that it would be an exceptional hardship to
postpone the entry or re-entry until a court order is obtained.209

Although closely related to the use of force to protect property, recaption is
separate in the Model Penal Code.210
This separate right of recaption provides a useful template for laws
governing hacking back, although further analogy is necessary. Returning to
the example of Bill and Jeremy, imagine that Jeremy steals some of Bill’s
207

The Use of Deadly Force in the Protection of Property Under the Model Penal
Code, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1959).
208
See MODEL PENAL CODE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06 comment
5(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“To allow recaption in [the circumstance of retaking
chattel after time has elapsed] would create a grave risk of a breach of the peace,
for the aggressor acting under the claim of right is likely to defend his newly won
possession, and to permit recaption would therefore to be to permit fighting. . . .
[The purpose of the traditional Statute of Forcible Entry governing recapture of
land was to] “require parties to submit disputes to the courts, and thus to prevent
breaches of the peace.”
209
MODEL PENAL CODE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06(1)(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 1985).
210
See MODEL PENAL CODE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06 comment
5(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (explaining that the Model Penal Code distinguishes
between “rules for the use of protective force and the rules for re-entry and
recaption . . . .”).
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personal possessions. Applying the test of MPC 3.06, it could be justifiable
for Bill to take back his personal property if he believed it “immediately
necessary.” Jeremy’s initial interference with Bill’s property rights justifies
some resulting intrusion by Bill into Jeremy’s rights.
To illustrate how the framework of MPC 3.06 could shape laws
governing hacking back, imagine the digital equivalent. Assume that Bill
operates a thriving retail and manufacturing business out of his home
comprised of a computer, a website, and an internet enabled 3D printer.
Jeremy hacks into Bill’s computer and steals consumer credit card
information stored on it, saving it to his hard drive. Jeremy also controls a
sizeable botnet through his personal computer and directs it to launch a
DDoS attack on Bill’s website, bringing it down. Finally, Jeremy exploits
the botnet to gain control of Bill’s 3D printer and causes it to malfunction.
The basic scenario is the same as in the hypothetical above: Jeremy has
interfered with Bill’s property. Only the nature of the intrusion is different.
Bill still has physical possession of his computer and printer, but Jeremy has
wrongfully copied some files, and taken control of the printer. If MPC 3.06
were the framework for hacking back laws, Bill might be able to hack back
to erase the stolen files, end the DDoS attack, and regain control of his
printer. It is analogous to Bill taking back his physical property above. The
basic premise is the same: Jeremy’s meddling with Bill’s property merits
some form of response to restore Bill’s property interests.
Of course, there is a fundamental threshold difference between
recaption as envisioned by MPC 3.06, and hacking back of the sort
contemplated in the Bill and Jeremy example. The MPC right of recaption
is not directly relevant to hacking back. It provides a justification for the use
of non-deadly force against the person of another, rather than for
interference with property, such as a computer within the meaning of the
CFAA. Except for the general defense of “choice of evils,” the MPC does
not address the justification for interference with property.211 However, the
law generally regards any use of force against a person as a more serious
wrong than interference with personal property. Therefore, the framework
for recaption in MPC 3.06 should be sufficient, as a policy matter, to justify
the lesser wrong of interference with personal property.
Such interference already has a close analogy in the context of torts.
Although tort law does not permit the use of force for recapture of chattels
“once possession is clearly lost,” it “permits a defendant who is entitled to
immediate possession to recover the goods from another’s land (a) if the
defendant did not cause the intrusion of the goods in the first place and (b)

211
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if entry is reasonable as to both time and manner.”212 For example, “[i]t is
not disputed that if . . . [chattels belonging to another] have come upon the
land through the wrongful conduct of the landowner, a privilege to enter
and recover them exists.”213 In exercising that privilege, “[r]easonable
amounts of damage may be done, even to the extent of breaking down a
fence or a door . . . The privilege is complete, and, so long as only
reasonable force is used, the defendant is not liable for any damage he may
do.”214 In some circumstances a person may use force against the physical
property of someone who has taken his own property, in the attempt to
recapture it. This is particularly instructive in the context of hacking back,
because breaking down a thief’s door to regain stolen property is similar to
hacking back against a digital aggressor to restore a compromised
computer.
Allowing for some leeway regarding where force may be directed
in recapturing property, the conceptual underpinning of MPC 3.06 fits well
with the basic nature of remedial action in the IoT. Reworking is necessary
to accommodate the differences between the physical and digital arenas,
because they result in somewhat distinct property interests and methods of
recaption. A rudimentary sketch of a law governing counterstrikes may be
imagined by modifying MPC 3.06(1)(b) to rectify these disparities and to
clarify that force may be used against the property of another:
Damage to, intrusion into, or interference with, the computer of
another . . . is justifiable when protecting property . . . if the actor
believes that such action is immediately necessary . . . to regain control
of a computer, website, digital information, or computer enabled
device, provided that the actor [reasonably]215 believes that he or the
person by whose authority he acts . . . was unlawfully deprived of
control of such computer, website, digital information, or computer
enabled device . . . and is entitled to regain control, and provided,
further, that:
(i) the action is used immediately after such interference with
control; or
212
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(ii) the actor believes that the person against whom he takes this
action has no claim of right to the interference with control of the
computer, website, digital information, or computer enabled
device . . . .”

This formulation is intended as merely a rough illustration of how the
template of recaption law might apply to hacking back, and to further paint
the analogy between recapture of physical property and remedial action in
the IoT. A comprehensive statute is well beyond the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, an additional consideration demands attention.
MPC 3.06 contains temporal limitations that could greatly hinder an
analogous right to hack back. MPC 3.06(1)(b) demands immediacy,
requiring a belief of “immediate” necessity, and actions that are “used
immediately or on fresh pursuit after such dispossession.”216 These
requirements may be impractical in the context of an attack in the IoT
because it may be impossible to quickly assess the harm and identify the
perpetrator.217 State laws modifying MPC 3.06 provide models for a more
flexible timing requirement. For example, Connecticut allows force for the
recapture of personal property “when and to the extent that [the recapturer]
reasonably believes such to be necessary . . . to regain property which he
reasonably believes to have been acquired by larceny within a reasonable
time prior to the use of such force.”218 Extending the window in which the
victim of a botnet attack may respond from immediacy to reasonableness, as
Connecticut does for recaption, could better accommodate a range of
remedial actions.
With these modifications to recapture law framework, more
aggressive forms of hacking back might be legally permissible. Of course,
creating a right of reentry or recapture based on the MPC is just one way
that hacking back might be legalized. Other routes have been suggested.
For example, one proposal would amend the CFAA to allow a limited selfhelp privilege narrowly cabined by four requirements:
(1) the counterattack must be necessary and proportional to the threat
being mitigated or prevented; (2) the counterattack must be in response
to an ongoing or repeated attack; (3) the counterattacker must submit a
good-faith justification and notification to the government; and (4) the
counterattacker must assume strict liability for all damage to third

Id. We omitted the MPC language about “fresh pursuit” from our model statute
because we are unaware of a digital equivalent for the concept.
217
See Lin, supra note 198, at 15 (observing that quick attribution is inaccurate, and
accurate attribution is slow).
218
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216
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parties, and liability for all negligently caused unnecessary damage to
the original attacker. 219

Amending the CFAA has some proponents in Congress. Indeed,
Georgia representative Tom Graves proposed the Active Cyber
Defense Certainty Act (ACDC), which would change the CFAA so
that it would not apply to victims of cyberattacks who accessed
attackers’ networks to “gather information in order to establish
attribution of criminal activity to share with law enforcement” or to
“disrupt continued unauthorized activity against the victim’s own
network.”220

Others propose a path for legalizing remedial action through analogy to
retail security guards,221 bounty hunters, or private investigators.222 Under
these theories, remedial actions like planting malware in botnets or
searching the networks of invaders could be “considered seizure of an
offensive weapon” or security patrols, respectively. Other theories have
looked to tort law exceptions such as private nuisance, trespass to
chattels,223 “the recapture of chattels privilege, entry upon land to remove
chattels, private necessity, or even the castle doctrine.”224 But even if
legalizing hacking back under any of these theories would be possible, it is
not necessarily a good idea. The next subsection explores the pitfalls.

C. The Ethical and Logistical Problems with Hacking Back
Hacking back has garnered considerable attention in the wake of
prominent hacks,225 but the attention has not all been positive.226 Critics
have highlighted a range of logistical and ethical issues. Logistically, it is
219
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unclear that hacking back would be an effective solution even if legalized.
One major logistical concern is the danger of escalation. Hacking back may
create new attacks rather than end ongoing ones.227 Two considerations
magnify this danger. First, not all hackers will be deterred by remedial
action.228 Some, such as hacktivists, may welcome the challenge and ramp
up their attacks.229 Alternatively, where the initial aggressor is a foreign
government or criminal organization, escalated retaliation is likely.230
American companies engaged in hack backs against such actors will not be
able to out-violate the law.231 Second, companies are not as well-equipped
as the government to assess the likelihood of foreign escalation.232
Disturbingly, a company’s remedial action could be perceived by a foreign
country as “a military response from our state.”233 Remedial action from an
American company could become “the opening volleys of a cyberwar,
which could escalate into a physical or kinetic war.”234
Another major logistical concern focuses on the danger that
remedial actions could create chaos in the wake of hacks. Some in law
enforcement warn that remedial action could “lead to confusion in
investigating cyberattacks.”235 Remedial action looks similar to the tools
used by the initial aggressors, and makes it “much harder to distinguish
between the good guys and the bad guys online.”236 And remedial action
could also muddle the judicial recourse for cyberattacks because evidence
gained through hacking back may be inadmissible for those bringing suit
under the CFAA.237
One last logistical criticism of remedial action is rooted in the
relationship between companies and the cybersecurity firms they may
contract with to provide remedial action. Cybersecurity firms are given
access to corporate networks and are in the ideal position to steal
information from the companies that hired them.238 Even if outright theft by
cybersecurity firms is unlikely, there is a perverse incentive. As one article
phrased the relationship: “Would there not be a conflict of interest . . .
Id. (Security experts are concerned that hacking back could become a “vehicle
for more attacks.”).
228
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229
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230
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between treating a problem (ongoing revenue for your security firm) and
curing it (which ends their engagement)?”239
The ethical critiques of remedial action are similarly varied. One
focuses on the relationship between private and public that hacking back
might fuel. For example, remedial action intrudes on the domain of force
against foreign actors that generally belongs to the state.240 Alternatively,
remedial action by private companies presents a danger of government
ratification of illegal behavior as in Russia, which is said to rely on
“intelligence gathered by criminals, allowing it to benefit from crimes
without accepting responsibility for them.”241
Other ethical concerns abound. For example, information security
professionals that engage in remedial actions may actually violate the
professional code of their licensing agency.242 Additionally, even if hacking
back were to be legalized under U.S. law, it might still “violate foreign
laws.”243 Finally, some distinguish hacking back from self-defense because
unlike self-defense, the justifying threat is not existential.244
One last major criticism involves both logistical and ethical
dilemmas. For hacking back to work, the entity doing it must be able to
identify the perpetrator of the hack. As discussed more fully in Section
IV.A., identifying hackers is difficult because they “‘like to cover their
tracks by routing attacks through other people’s computers, without the
owners’ knowledge.”245 As a result, remedial action is hampered by time
and certainty.246 Quick remedial actions are likely to be uncertain and could
be against the wrong party, while accurate attribution is likely to be too
slow to be to allow for effective remediation.247 Ethically, this presents two
major problems. First, remedial actions risk collateral damage to innocent
parties. Second, the limitations on attribution temper the justification of
remedial action as self-defense. Using force against a cyber aggressor is
one thing, using it against a victim is another.
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When applied to a hypothetical, many of these logistical and ethical
critiques are damning. Return one last time to the example of Jeremy’s
hack. In using Bill and Jeremy to illustrate how recapture of property law
might provide a framework for the legalization of hacking back, it was
necessary to analogize between the physical world and the digital world as
so many accounts of hacking do.248 But many of the ethical and logistical
critiques of remedial action illustrate that such analogies are imperfect, even
if plausible. For example, in the Jeremy and Bill example, Bill was able to
attribute the attack to Jeremy. That degree of certainty is unlikely in reality,
and especially within a short period of time. Second, the hypothetical
presented Jeremy and Bill as sharing physical proximity. In the digital age
a hacker may be far away, often in another country. The hacker may even
be the agent of a foreign government. By hacking back against Jeremy, Bill
may have waded into the waters of international aggression and escalation.
Alternatively, Jeremy could be an innocent party whose network has been
compromised by someone else. He might then mistake Bill’s defensive
hack back for an initial aggression, and respond with a new attack. Of
course, it is unlikely that both parties would be individuals. They could be
corporations, governments, criminal organizations, or teams. Perhaps that
is most indicative of the core problem: the uncertainty inherent in
cyberattacks and the IoT makes solutions simultaneously essential but
difficult.

VI. OTHER OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF THE IOT
If remedial actions like hacking back cannot remedy the numerous
and grave threats that permeate the era of the IoT, and the CFAA is
insufficient, then it is essential to find another way to reduce vulnerabilities
and prevent attacks. Although there are many possibilities,249 this section
briefly explores two possible prospective solutions: (1) a standards
approach; and (2) agency regulation.
Both solutions differ from remedial actions such as hacking back by
focusing more on securing new IoT devices rather than combatting existing
ones that have already been corrupted. Both solutions are grounded in the
same understanding of the problems with the IoT. Proponents of a standards
approach and agency regulation often view the IoT as a victim of a market
failure, as Section II illustrates.250 Consumers want IoT devices to be as
248
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cheap as possible.251 Manufacturers and retailers oblige, prioritizing cost
over security because they have no incentive not to.252 International supply
chains and the limited security expertise of many IoT design teams further
complicate matters.253 The widespread weaknesses in IoT devices offer an
enticing tool and opportunity for nefarious activity. This section evaluates
the potential of a standards approach or agency regulation to break this
cycle.

A. The Standards Approach
Vulnerabilities like default passwords and static firmware threaten
IoT security. Although they are suboptimal, because there is no uniform set
of standards that IoT manufacturers or retailers must meet they are not
technically substandard.254 The standards approach would attempt to
remedy this by imposing such a system on key players.
A standards system would combat the market failure by
incentivizing better security practices in the proliferation of IoT devices.255
According to one expert, adopting “defined standards” will “change buying
and investment patterns” that are responsible for the current state of
vulnerability in the IoT.256 Imposing stronger security measures through
standards for IoT developers is important because “[s]ecurity needs to be
built into IoT devices, not bolted on. If cybersecurity is not part of the early
design of an IoT device, it’s too late for effective risk control.”257
Establishing standards that require better security measures from the start
implicates “domestic and international” standards setting entities like the
International Standards Organization (ISO) or the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST),258 and may require government
intervention.259
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Generally, organizations advocating for the use of a standardsbased approach emphasize the importance of a consistent and uniform
standard,260 but the priorities of an IoT security standard might vary. For
example, Dale Drew—a proponent of a standards approach—is preoccupied
with remedying vulnerabilities like default passwords, “hard-coded
credentials,” and the “lack of capability of updating [IoT device]
firmware.”261
One bipartisan legislative attempt at employing a standards
approach, titled “The Internet of Things Cybersecurity Act of 2017,” is
currently pending before Congress.262 The Bill would apply to IoT devices
sold to the federal government, and “requires that manufacturers that sell
smart devices to government agencies regularly patch their products for
vulnerabilities and steer clear from using hard-coded passwords to access
the devices via a backdoor.”263
Assuming arguendo that agreement could be reached on the correct
standards, this approach would still have a serious limitation: it would not
affect the millions of existing devices.

B. Agency Regulation
Some experts have concluded that the pervasive threats to the IoT,
and the related market failure, require increased government
involvement.264 They argue that “[c]ybersecurity ought to be a public good
much like automobile safety.”265
One possibility is to expand the capabilities of existing government
agencies to test IoT security. To promote automobile safety, there are
federally funded research and development centers, testing facilities run by
the National Transportation Safety Board (post market), automotive crash
safety testing (premarket), and the Nevada National Security Site
260
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(destruction and survivability testing).266 But no analogous regulatory
entities or research facilities currently exist to provide a proving ground for
embedded cybersecurity defenses needed by IoT.267 Such facilities would
remedy the government’s lack of a means to “conduct thorough security
testing and assessment on IoT devices” and would reduce the inefficiencies
of having diffuse entities conducting independent research.268 This
expansion could potentially fall under the control of the National Science
Foundation or the NIST.269
Another possibility is the creation of a new regulatory agency.
Bruce Schneier advocates for this position and analogizes the IoT to the
once-new technologies of the past that gave rise to new agencies: “trains,
cars, airplanes, radio, and nuclear power.”270 He argues that “[i]n the world
of dangerous things, we constrain innovation,”271 and that the IoT presents
new dangers just as those earlier technologies did during their development.
As a result, even if regulation would stifle some creativity, Schneier
suggests that this is a necessary sacrifice for security.272 Furthermore, the
IoT presents problems that the market cannot or will not solve on its own.
The most prominent is the market failure and the lack of consumer and
manufacturer incentives to resolve technological vulnerabilities in the
IoT.273 Schneier argues that—as with environmental pollution—regulation
is essential because the dangers and ill effects are felt only downstream.274
In the current political environment, which favors smaller
government and reducing regulation, it seems doubtful that this approach
could get traction in Congress. And if it did so, recruiting the necessary
expertise and resources could be a daunting task.

CONCLUSION
The dangers in the IoT are complex, multifaceted, and numerous;
and none of the possible solutions discussed in this article is wholly
satisfying. For example, the current legal regime under the CFAA governs
many of the threats in the IoT, and there have been some successful
prosecutions under it. However, the CFAA’s utility is severely limited by
266
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practical and jurisdictional concerns, and it also prohibits some remedial
actions against hacking. Similar contradictions are apparent with the
alternative solutions evaluated in this article. Remedial actions like hacking
back could ameliorate the perils of botnets, but they suffer from legal,
ethical, and practical drawbacks. A standards approach might help secure
the IoT prospectively, but it does nothing to eliminate the threat posed by
preexisting botnets and compromised IoT devices. Agency regulation
might provide similar relief, but seems unlikely in the current political
climate.
Given these obstacles, it is tempting to do nothing, despite the
overwhelming and quickly accelerating dangers posed by the IoT. That
would be the worst option of all. First, an absence of official action should
not be mistaken for an absence of action. If the government does not act to
secure the IoT, others will, and the results could be chaotic and perilous.
This inevitability may already be occurring: self-appointed vigilante “white
hat” hackers are suspected in the proliferation of three botnets. One, known
as Hajime, “has infected at least 10,000 home routers, network-connected
cameras, and other so-called Internet of Things devices” with the apparent
goal of “disrupt[ing] Mirai and similar IoT botnets.”275 Even assuming that
the vigilante hackers have good intentions, their solution is fleeting, the
methodology is illegal, and it interferes with “tens of thousands of devices”
without the permission of their owners.276 The other botnets, known as
“BrickerBot.1” and “BrickerBot.2” may have a similar goal, but are
particularly destructive: they are “designed to damage routers and other
Internet-connected appliances so badly that they become effectively
inoperable.”277 If these developments are any indication, without official
intervention, the fight to secure the IoT could become a war of attrition with
many innocent victims.
Second, the extraordinary growth of the IoT and its extreme
vulnerability threaten individuals, businesses, and the broader society.
Insecure IoT devices may be corrupted and exploited to attack the internet
itself, threatening our reliance on the internet for things such as finance,
news, healthcare, education, communication, information storage, and
more.278 Alternatively, IoT devices present new and unique opportunities
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for malicious actors to turn digital hacking into physical consequences.279
Hackers can already jeopardize a frightening array of internet-enabled
objects including cars, trains, voting machines, power plants, dams, home
thermostats, implanted medical devices, and possibly airplanes.280 With
ever-increasing internet connectivity, the perils could implicate any device
that is connected to the internet. In the face of these potentially crippling
threats, action is essential. If we wait passively for the full array of dangers
of the IoT to become a reality, the wait will not be long, and the crisis could
be severe.
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